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THE SYSTEM OF IN TERN ATION AL TRU STEESHIP

Rayford W . L ogan I n t r o d u c t i o n
The logical basis for an evaluation of the trusteeship system established in the Charter of the United Nations is a comparison o f it with the man date system of the Covenant of the League of Nations. While this com parison is not entirely satisfactory because o f differences o f opinion as to the value o f the mandate system, three facts are beyond dispute.
One is that no mandated area in habited by peoples of African or mixed African descent1 had made any appreciable progress toward selfgovernment or independence between 1919 and 1939. By contrast Iraq was given her 1' independence, 9 ' Syria and the Lebanon were promised indepen dence and Trans-Jordan has recently been promised independence. Of the mandated areas inhabited by peoples who are not o f African or mixed A f rican descent, only Palestine has not been given or not promised indepen dence, and the special circumstances in Palestine are well known.
Second, the mandate system had not appreciably improved the well being o f the African peoples in Africa and in the Pacific in some respects. The author of this article published statistical evidence showing, for ex ample, the infinitesimally small sums spent on education in A frica through 1927.2 3 Unpublished findings based upon the annual reports of the man datories show that until the eve of the second world war these expenditures continued to be ridiculously small, as were those for other social services such as public health.
Third, the effectiveness of the su pervision by the Permanent Mandates Commission left much to be desired. Lord Hailey recognized that the Com mission " is on its strongest ground in dealing with legal questions, and is at times able to point to definite breaches o f the mandate, but it would be quite impracticable for it to attempt to con trol the mandatories.9,3 As early as 1926 a serious effort was made to give the P. M. C. three additional powers, namely, to draw up a questionnaire as a basis for the annual reports of the mandatories, to hear oral peti tions, and to make its own investiga tions. Because o f the opposition of the mandatories these powers were not granted.4 *
O b j e c t i v e s
Against this summary background we can proceed to our comparison. Let it be noted, first of all, that the Charter did not originate the idea of trusteeship, since the ethical basis of the mandate system was this same 286 THE JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION ideal of trusteeship. Article 22 of the Covenant stated that the " well-being and development ' ' of the peoples to be mandated " form a sacred trust of civilization. 31 Curiously enough, the words " sacred trust" do not appear in Chapters X I I and X I I I of the Charter which deal with the trust ter ritories but in Chapter X I, article 73, which deals with colonies and protec torates. The importance of this Chap ter will be discussed later.
The specific obligations o f the trus tees are, however, more clearly stated in the Charter than in the Covenant. Since the communities formerly be longing to Turkey were already rec ognized in 1919 as being almost ripe for independence, the significant stip ulations dealt with the African and Pacific mandated areas. These were not considered ready for self-govern ment or independence, and there was no indication when they would be. Meanwhile, the mandatories were to administer them in such a way as to guarantee freedom o f conscience or religion subject only to the mainte nance o f public order and morals, the prohibition of the slave trade, traffic in arms and liquor, and the preven tion of the establishment of fortifica tions or military and naval bases and of military training of Natives5 for other than police purposes and the de fense of the territory. France, because of her special needs in Europe, was exempted from this last prohibition. In addition all Members of the League of Nations were to enjoy " equal op-& portunities" for trade and commerce in the Class B mandates, namely, in Tanganyika, the two Cameroons, the two, Togos and Ruanda-Urundi. This equality of commerce and trade was not to apply, however, to the Class C mandates, namely, South-West A f rica and all those in the Pacific.
The Charter makes no such invid ious distinction between " white" peo ples who would soon be ready for in dependence and the Negro and Ne groid peoples for whom independence or self-government was not specified. There are no classes of trust areas in the Charter. It should be pointed out, however, that practically all the peo ples envisaged by the Charter for trust areas are Negroes or o f Negro mixture.
The Charter, moreover, specifically states that one of the ob jectives of the trusteeship system is " to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement o f the inhabitants of the trust terri tories, and their progressive develop ment towards self-government or in dependence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agree ment." Of course, this clause (article 76, paragraph b) provides three es capes. The words, " as may be appro priate to the particular circumstances o f each territory and its peoples," is one. The pretext that it was impos sible to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of the mandated areas in A f rica was used at the end of the first world war to evade the holding of plebiscites there. Even Lloyd George had proclaimed in his famous speech THE SYSTEM OP INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP 287 o f January 5, 1918, that " the general principle o f national self-determina tion is as applicable in the cases of the German colonies as in those of oc cupied European territories. ' ,6 Rut article 22 specified this right for only the Turkish communities. When ques tions were later raised in the English Parliament about consultation with the peoples o f the African mandated areas, Bonar Law, replying for the government, was something less than candid. One member derisively que ried : " I f there is to be a poll of these East-African niggers and other col oured races, will it be taken on the principle of proportional representa tion ?" Another added the coup de grâce when he interposed: " W ill the women be allowed to vote?" 6 7 In the third place the clause, " and as may be provided by the terms o f each trus teeship agreement," may be not only an addition but a limitation upon this free expression.
The Charter repeats in paragraph c o f this article substantially the mag nificent language of the Purposes of article 1 in the following words: " to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encour age recognition o f the interdepen dence o f the peoples o f the world." The achievement o f this end, as o f the others, will be determined not by the beauty of the language but by the effectiveness o f the system.
The African Mandated Areas in World Poli tics.
The final basic objective in article 76 may well prove one of the most significant in Chapters X I I and X III. It will be recalled that the Covenant stipulated " equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League" as far as the Class B mandates were concerned. The Charter prescribes the basic ob jective " to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial mat ters for all Members o f the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration o f justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions o f Article 80." The sig nificance o f the first part o f this clause is that it makes the open door swing both ways, from the Members of the United Nations into the trust terri tories and for the peoples of the trust territories into the territory of the Members o f the United Nations. In the past, the open door has been a one way street, purporting to give equal ity of trade and commerce to superior nations in backward countries without granting reciprocity to the backward nations. The Western powers, for ex ample, enjoyed the open door based upon the principle o f the mostfavored-nation in China, but China was not accorded equal rights in the western nations. The principle of the open door was applied to the Conven tional Congo Basin, but the Native peoples o f that region were given no such equality in the territory of the signatories. Clearly, imperial prefer ence which some spokesmen in the British Commonwealth are still urg ing is forbidden in the trust areas by this paragraph.
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The key words in this section are " their nationals," a term which is much more inclusive than citizens, which would exclude most o f the Na tive peoples o f trust territories from this reciprocity. The potentialities o f this section are fascinating. For it is to " ensure" equal treatment in the administration o f justice and in social as well as economic and commercial matters. What would happen if a Ne gro from an African trust area at tempted to sit in the front o f an intra state bus in Mississippi? W ould he be ensured equality o f treatment with white Americans or would this equal ity have to be achieved by segregating white Americans in that African trust territory?
Reference to article 80 limits some what the value o f this paragraph. This article, known as the " Conservatory Clause," makes possible, for example, the continuation temporarily of un equal treatment for trade and com merce in South-West A frica and the other Class C mandated areas until trusteeship agreements have been con cluded. In fact, the language would seem to permit the permanent contin uation o f this unequal treatment in the Class C mandated areas unless the trusteeship agreements so specify. This clause was added not only to pro tect the holders of Class C mandates but also the Arabs in Palestine. Fear that the loophole might provide a pre text for delay in the drafting of trus teeship agreements is seen in the sec ond section of article 80 which spe cifically prohibits such delay.
A l l o c a t i o n o f T r u s t T e r r i t o r ie s
The specific objectives of the trus teeship system are thus more clearly stated than were those of the mandate system. But the designation of the trust territories is more vague than was that of the mandated areas. The Covenant designated the former Turk ish communities and the former Ger man colonies as those which should be placed under mandate. The language of article 22 left no discretion. More over, the Supreme Council in Paris allotted mandates for the German possessions on May 7, 1919, more than six weeks before the Treaty of Ver sailles was signed.8 But at San Fran cisco it was agreed that no allocations were to be made.9 The Charter, more over, leaves it entirely to the discre tion or good w ill of each nation con cerned to determine for itself whether it w ill place any territory under trus teeship. In order that there may be no doubt on this score, it is necessary to quote the exact language o f article 77. It reads: " 1. The trusteeship sys tem shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trus teeship agreements: " a. territories now held under mandate; " b. territories which may be de tached from enemy states as a result of the Second W orld W ar; and " c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states respon sible for their administration. " 2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms. ' ' 
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In addition, article 79 provides:
' 1 The terms o f trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trus teeship system, including any altera tion or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly con cerned, including the mandatory power in the case o f territories held under mandate by a Member o f the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85."
There is no agreement as to who are " the states directly concerned." Russia, for example, has asked for a trusteeship over Tripolitania. Does that request make her a state directly concerned in the event that a trustee ship should be established over that former Italian colony? One point, however, seems to be generally recog nized, namely, that the United States, having been one of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, is a na tion directly concerned in the man dated areas. The United States clearly established this interest in the years immediately after the first world war.10
To date, four agreements are in process of being drafted, those for Tanganyika, British Togo, British Cameroons and Belgian RuandaUrundi. It had been hoped that these drafts would be ready for submission to the General Assembly at its forth coming September, 1946, session. Re liable information, however, indicates that this hope will not be realized. I f this information is correct, then the earliest possible date at which these drafts will be submitted for approval by the General Assembly will be Sep- The Union of South Africa, mean while, has been desirous of incorpo rating the mandated area of SouthWest A frica into the Union as a fifth province.11 The basis for this incor poration is the alleged desire of the " people" o f South-West Africa. By " people," Prime Minister Smuts of the Union o f South Africa means, of course, only the white people. It is encouraging to note that both at San Francisco and at the meeting of the General Assembly in London this pro posal met such adamant opposition that even the redoubtable Smuts seems to have been impressed. Smuts has been so long paraded as a liberal in this country and in England even by persons who should know better that, mayhap, the mantle of liberalism, however specious, may make him hesi tate to flaunt world public opinion, if there be such a nebulous entity. But how do the winds blow in the Union o f South A frica? Since this writer has devoted some portion of his last fifteen years to the unmasking of Jan Christiaan Smuts, he must now point out that the septuagenarian racebaiter has a disciple, Oswald Pirow, who sometimes surpasses the maestro in ringing the * changes upon white supremacy. The death of Smuts will not mean the end of racism in the Union.
France also has been recalcitrant about placing Togo and the Cam- The Russians demanded a Russian trusteeship for Tripolitania, either in order to place themselves athwart the British " life-line to India' ' or to gain a bargaining position to win Trieste for the Yugo-Slavs. The British re membered that they had promised not to subject the Native peoples of Cyrenaica to Italian rule. And, more ominously, the British, in order to maintain control of two Ethiopian provinces, professed a willingness to give Ethiopia a portion of Eritrea. It is probably no mere coincidence that at just about this time there was pub lished in the United States A Short History of Eritrea by Stephen H. Longrigg, the British Chief Adminis trator of Eritrea, 1942 Eritrea, -1944 , who roundly asserts: " Indeed Eritrea pos sesses none of the qualities of geo graphical or cultural singleness which should entitle it to be a unit of terri tory or of government; nor, since an tiquity until its consolidation as an Italian colony, had its various peoples ever obeyed a single rule." 13
In the fourth place, the recent con tract between the Sinclair Oil Cor poration and Ethiopia would make that powerful American corporation desirous of aiding Ethiopia in her ef forts to obtain an outlet to the sea at Massaua in Eritrea, by far the best port on the Red Sea. In brief, the former Italian colonies are a football of power politics. Perhaps by the time that this article is published the June Paris Conference of the F or eign Secretaries of the Big Four will have disposed of the former Italian colonies. I f the settlement is not the establishment of a real trusteeship, the annexationists in the United States Navy Department will hold the last trump. Perhaps they have been waiting for this settlement in order to play it. Advocates of a real trusteeship insist that under it the United States would have all the pro tection she needs. Evidently some naval spokesmen doubt this assur ance.14 Korea, another area detached from the enemy, seemed likely to be the first trust territory established. But trus teeship there has apparently found ered upon the rocks of power politics.
The We are constrained to repeat that we want performances, not promises. How long will Trinidad, Barbados, and the other British West Indies have to wait for a Jamaica constitu tion? How soon will Jamaica have a true parliamentary system o f govern ment, without the English governor's veto in vital matters? Does a major ity of one in the proposed Nigerian territorial governments really assure a Native majority? When will the African Natives of Kenya have at least as many rights as the Indians there have?
Are some French colonials correct in their assertion that the raising of the status of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Reunion to departments is a Machiavellian device to keep the white planters there in control and to make the Negroes there feel that they are superior to the Negroes in the other French dependencies?
Is it revolution in Indonesia that has induced the Netherlands to put on paper their promise of partnership for Indonesia, and is it the compla cency of Negroes in Curasao territory and Dutch Guiana (Surinam) that has permitted the Dutch government not to put on paper partnership for these non-self-governing areas?
So little is known about the Span ish and Portuguese colonies that even Lord Hailey recognized that he had little information about them. But the dictatorships of Franco and of Salazar hold out little hope for selfgovernment, independence, or firstclass citizenship for the non-self-gov erning territories of Spain or Portu gal. Evidence is lacking that the United States has any intention of placing any of her non-self-governing territories under trusteeship. Uranium deposits in the Belgian Congo will alone suffice, probably, to prevent trusteeship there.
M a c h i n e r y o p t h e T r u s t e e s h i p C o u n c i l
We come now to an analysis of the machinery of the trusteeship system. It has been argued that the Trustee ship Council is " designed to be a more important and effective organ than the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League. 9 9 This, it is stated, has been achieved, in the first instance, by the designation in article 7 of the Trusteeship Council as one of the principal organs of the United Na tions.18 The Trusteeship Council thus has more prestige than did the P. M. C. which was not a principal organ of the League o f Nations. But the Trusteeship Council, while it is a principal organ, is not a coordinate organ. Article 83 states that " All functions o f the United Nations relat ing to strategic areas, including the approval o f the terms o f the trustee ship agreements and of their altera tion or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council." The article adds that the Security Council " shall . . . avail itself o f the assistance o f the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations un der the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educa tional matters in the strategic areas. 9 9
Article 85 correspondingly states that the functions o f the United Nations with respect to trusteeship agree ments for non-strategic areas shall be exercised by the General Assembly and that the " Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions. ' 9 Article 87, analyzed below, makes even clearer that the Trusteeship Council acts under the authority of the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council may have more prestige as a result of its desig nation as a principal organ, but that designation does not necessarily give it more power than the P. M. C. pos sessed.
It has been further argued that since the Members o f the Trusteeship Council will be official, it should be better equipped to handle political problems than were the members of the P. M. C. who were unofficial rep resentatives.19 There is the danger, on the other hand, that official repre sentatives will be bound by instruc tions from their governments instead of being outspoken critics of the ad ministration of the mandated areas, as was notably Miss Dannevig of the P. M. C.
The distribution of the members of the Trusteeship Council does not im press this writer as an improvement over that of the P. M. C. The latter had a majority o f members from nonmandatory powers20 whereas the mem bership of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between nations ad ministering trust areas and those not administering trust areas (article 86). These latter representatives will be at a disadvantage, moreover, since there is no limitation on the length of serv ice of the representatives o f the na tions administering trust areas but the representatives of nations not ad ministering trust areas may serve, only three years.
It will be recalled that the attempt was made to strengthen the P. M. C. by giving it the right to draw up a questionnaire, to hear oral petitions, and to make its own investigations. On May 4 the American delegation circulated at a press conference a draft which stated: " 10. The General Assembly, and under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, should be empow ered to consider reports submitted by the administering authorities, to ac cept petitions, to institute investiga tions, and to take other action within their competence as defined by the trusteeship arrangements.
" 11. The administering authority in each trust territory within the competence o f the General Assembly should make an annual report to the 294 THE JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION General Assembly upon the basis of a questionnaire formulated by the Trus teeship Council." 22
Commander Stassen, the American delegate assigned to the task of draft ing these provisions for the American delegation, explained at the press con ference that in the final draft of the Charter the word " should " would be replaced by " shall."
The writer attempted to convince the American technical experts that the words " to accept petitions" did not include oral petitions and that the final draft should make specific refer ence to them. He was told that oral petitions were implied and that " We can't spell out everything." He con tended further that it was not suffi cient " to institute investigations" ; there should be assurance that the re port of the investigation would be published. The answer was similarpublication was implied and " We can't spell out everything." 23
Let us now look at the final draft of the Charter. Article 88 states: " The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, eco nomic, social, and educational ad vancement o f the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administer ing authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual re port to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire." This article thus follows substantially the American draft of May 4.
Three important provisions of this article must be noted. First, the for mulation of the questionnaire is man datory, for the Trusteeship Council " shall" formulate it. The impor tance of this wdll be apparent when we contrast this mandatory obligation with the permissive language dealing with petitions and investigations. Sec ond, although the formulation of the questionnaire is mandatory " for each trust territory,77 the submission of the annual report is prescribed for only those trust territories that are " with in the competence of the General As sembly, 77 in other words, for only the non-strategic trust territories. Third, the annual report for these nonstrategic trust territories is to be " upon the basis of such question naire." No argument is necessary to suggest that this language givers the administering authority considerable latitude. The language concerning petitions and investigations does not satisfy this writer. Article 87 stipulates : " The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Coun cil, in carrying out their functions, may :
" a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority; " b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the admin istering authority ; " c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and " d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trus teeship agreements."
It is instantly apparent that the force of this article is less than that o f the American draft and also less than that of article 88. The American draft of May 4 stated that the Trus teeship Council should be ' 4 empow ered' * to consider reports, to accept petitions and to institute investiga tions. Article 88 makes mandatory the formulation and submission o f the questionnaire and report. But under article 87 the Trusteeship Council " m ay" consider these reports.
Similarly, the Trusteeship Council is no longer empowered to accept pe titions as in the American draft of May 4 but " m ay" accept them. Moreover, while it was impossible to add three words, " and to hear," in order to make explicit oral petitions, it was possible to add nine words which, in the opinion of this writer, weaken the statement that oral peti tions are implied. In the first place, one does not " examine" oral peti tions ; one examines something that is written. Second, it is an axiom of legal interpretation that specification excludes implication. Since this ar ticle specifies that the petition may be examined in consultation with the administering authority, it excludes the presence of the petitioner. The right of petition, whether written or oral, results then in an ex parte con sultation between the Trusteeship Council and the administering au thority unless rules o f procedure change this clear meaning.
Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, one of the technical experts at San Francisco and now Acting Chief o f the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Office of Special Political Affairs, State De partment, has declared on the other hand in The Department of State Bulletin: " The pow'er to accept and examine petitions, oral as well as writ ten, wrhich was practiced by the man dates system with respect to written petitions but which was not included in the Covenant of the League of Na tions, is formalized in the Charter." 24 This writer can not accept this in terpretation as far as oral petitions are concerned. The only way by which oral petitions could have been " for malized" was for the Charter to specify oral petitions. It does not. The writer has been informed that in the minutes of the committee that drafted the trusteeship provisions it was recorded that oral petitions wrere included. The very fact that it was necessary to place this interpretation in the minutes is proof that oral peti tions are not " formalized" in the Charter. The value of this committee interpretation is subject to question. Evidence is lacking that the plenary session in adopting the Charter re corded this interpretation. Evidence is similarly lacking that the United States, in ratifying the Charter, ap proved this interpretation.
Final evidence that oral petitions were not " formalized" in the Char ter is found in the provisional rules of procedure for the Trusteeship Council drawn up by the Preparatory Commission in London. Dr. Bunche has pointed out that under these rules " there is recognition of the right of the inhabitants of trust territories or other interested parties to present oral as well as written petitions, was there to draw up rules o f proce dure to guarantee this right? The very fact that the United States 4' strongly' ' supported the interpreta tion clinches the position that the right of oral petitions was not ' ' for malized' ' in the Charter.
Regardless of this friendly contro versy, the writer sincerely hopes that the Trusteeship Council will approve these rules o f procedure. The General Assembly last February unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to transmit the provisional rules of procedure o f the Trusteeship Council to that organ as soon as it is constituted. Under article 90 the Trusteeship Council has the right to adopt its own rules of proce dure.
Let us now examine the import of the provisions dealing with investiga tions. The American draft of May 4 " empowered" the Trusteeship Coun cil " to institute investigations." As previously noted, the final language changes " empowered" to " may." More important is the fact that " in stitute investigations" was changed to " make periodic visits." " Investi gations" connotes something wrong. " Periodic visits" is entirely innocu ous. Most important, however, is the fact that while the Charter was so long that it could not specify the al legedly implied publication of the re ports of the investigations, it was short enough to add the words, " at times agreed upon with the adminis tering authority." Nothing in the trusteeship provisions makes the writer doubt even the sincerity of the architects of peace as does the addi tion o f these words. What butcher, for example, can not get his scales in order if he sets the date for the " visit" by the inspector from the Bureau o f Weights and Measures? The writer was an officer during the first world war in a camp where the commanding officer permitted, in fla grant violation o f army regulations, a bar in the officers' mess. The com mander knew the exact day and hour when General Pershing was to inspect the camp. A half hour before inspec tion the bar was boarded up. A half hour after inspection the boards were taken down.
It has been pointed out with some cogency that even when the adminis tering authority sets the date for the periodic visits, he can not over night construct schools, establish clinics and hospitals and fill them with surgical supplies. Nor is there much likeli hood that the administering authority will erect camouflage villages and pub lic buildings as did a minister of Catherine the Great of Russia. But the schools can be filled with an un usual number of students, the clinics can be cleaner than usual. Above all, in cases of serious social unrest, wit nesses can become suddenly unavail able if the administering authority sets the date for the periodic visit. A ny one who has undergone inspec tion will realize the abundant oppor tunities for skullduggery and misrep resentation under these added words.
Unfortunately, we are not told in the revealing article by Dr. Bunchc whether the rules of procedure drawn up by the London Preparatory Com mission for the Trusteeship Council specify publication of the results of the visit. We await the approval of these rules by the Trusteeship Coun cil in the hope that they are indeed " liberal." 26 Dr. Bunche, in language that is refreshingly candid for a State De partment publication, reveals what some critics had already deduced as the reason for the phraseology of these provisions. He states, with re spect to petitions and inspection: " It was felt by some delegations that great care should be taken not to im ply that the administering authority might be irresponsible, nor to belittle the administering authority in the eyes of the people administered." 27 It is easy enough to understand why there was more sensitiveness about the feelings o f the nations than there was about the welfare of the peoples to be placed under trusteeship. The preamble o f the Charter starts off with what is at best a half-truth, namely, " We the peoples of the United Na tions." So far as representation is concerned, the peoples to be placed under trusteeship or who will remain as colonial subjects had no spokesmen at San Francisco. This is one of the reasons why this writer has frequently referred to the Charter as a " tragic joke." Finally, the trusteeship provisions make possible the utilization of " vol unteer forces, facilities, and assis tance" from both the strategic and non-strategic areas28 in action taken by the Security Council for the main tenance o f international peace and security. One result of the second war to " make the world safe for de mocracy" is thus provision for the 26 Loc. dt. wider utilization of " savages" in " civilized warfare."
When the Trusteeship Council shall have been formally established, the trusteeship agreements published and the rules o f procedure revealed, we shall be in a better position to evalu ate Chapters X I I and X III. A t the present time, this writer is extremely skeptical as to its effectiveness for the promotion o f the ideals set forth as the basic objectives of the system. He hopes that he is wrong, but he fears that he is right.
N o n -S e l f -G o v e r n i n g T e r r i t o r i e s
Although this article deals with the trusteeship system, it would not be complete without an examination of Chapter X I of the Charter. For if the Trusteeship Council will probably not be " swamped" with former colo nies or protectorates, the provisions for those not placed under trusteeship are vitally important.
It has been previously pointed out that this Chapter contains the words " sacred trust" which are found in article 22 of the Covenant but not in Chapters X I I and X I I I of the Char ter. Chapter X I, moreover, states that " the interests of the inhabitants of these [non-self-governing] terri tories are paramount" and that the nations holding them accept " the ob ligation to promote to the utmost, . . . the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories." Chapters X I I and X I I I do not specify the paramountcy of Native interests nor do they im pose the obligation upon the adminis tering authorities to do their " ut most."
On the other hand, Chapter X I I specifies the " progressive develop 298 THE JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION ment" o f the trust territories toward ' ' self-government or independence, ' whereas Chapter X I uses the circum locution, 41 to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political in stitutions, according to the particular circumstances o f each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement. ' ' Independence as well as self-government is thus attain able under Chapter X I as they are under X II, but they are hedged about by dangerous limitations. There is, moreover, no provision for consulta tion to ascertain the wishes of the Natives as there is in Chapter X II.
Perhaps the most important para graph in Chapter X I has been over looked by analysts. Paragraph e of article 73 provides that the colonial powers are " to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considera tions may require, statistical and other information of a technical na ture relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the terri tories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters X I I and X I I I
apply-"
For the first time an international agreement places upon colonial pow ers the obligation to submit to an in ternational agency reports concerning conditions in their colonies. It was, moreover, agreed in London last Feb ruary that the Secretary-General is to include a summary of this informa tion in his annual report to the Gen eral Assembly. It will be interesting to follow the discussions in the As sembly of the Secretary-General^ summary o f the reports of the United States about Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and the " gold" and " silver" employees in the Panama Canal Zone.
As usual, the architects of peace took away with the left hand a por tion of what they had given with the right hand. It was no mere over sight that the paragraph dealing with these reports makes no mention of political conditions although the co lonial powers have accepted the " sa cred trust" to ensure political ad vancement as well as economic, social and educational. There is, as almost always, an escape clause-" subject to such limitation as security and con stitutional considerations may re quire."
Chapter X I has also been inter preted as making possible the holding of international conferences on colo nial matters. It seemed, indeed, at one time that such a conference would be held in the near future. But the proposal " got lost" in the State De partment. When this writer proposed on April 30 to Mr. Charles Thomson, who is temporarily in charge of the section of the State Department deal ing with the United Nations Educa tional, Scientific and Cultural Organ ization, that that organization might hold a conference on dependent peo ples, Mr. Thomson referred him to the Acting Chief of the Division of De pendent Area Affairs.29 It is to be hoped that UN will not wait for UNESCO while UNESCO waits for UN. Meanwhile, neither the Trustee ship Council nor UNESCO has been constituted.
C o n c l u s i o n
The reader has surely discerned two basic attitudes in this article. One is doubt as to the sincerity of the colo nial powers. This doubt stems from a conviction that the so-called backward countries are increasingly necessary to the great powers as markets and as sources o f man-power. Colonial subjects are among the most easily exploited customers on earth. A few of these dependent areas contain ma terials vital in the construction of atomic bombs. This writer does not pretend to know how important man power will be in the atomic and bac teriological wars of the future. Until that question has been decided, world powers will probably continue to base their war plans upon large armies. And in the meantime, dependent peo ples work at ridiculously low wages not only for the benefit of the capi talists and the industrialists but also for the benefit of the workers in in dustrialized countries. These work ers need to be educated to the realiza tion that so long as they insist upon low wages for the workers in the de pendent areas so that the workers in industrialized countries may buy those products at a cheap price, they are as guilty of exploitation as are the capitalists.
The second prevailing attitude in this article has been a rather dim view' about world public opinion, especially with respect to dependent areas. A t the previously mentioned meeting at the Parkside Hotel on February 1, 1945, Dr. Emory Ross presented the guests to Mr. Arthur Creech Jones in these words: " You see before you all sixteen of the persons in the United States who are interested in the prob lem of dependent areas." 30 Dr. Ross was, of course, half-facetious. But if the exact number of persons in the United States and other countries who are concerned with trusteeship and non -self -governing territories were known, the fact would probably be more discouraging than the halffacetious understatement.
The publication of this Yearbook will, naturally, considerably increase the number of persons who realize that a just and lasting peace for all peoples can not rest upon the con tinued exploitation of millions of col ored peoples aided by inadequate ma chinery for the prevention of that ex ploitation. Mayhap the instinct of self-preservation more than concern with the plight of underpaid, diseased, illiterate, dispossessed colored millions will some day create a powerful world public opinion that will demand the end of this degradation.
3° Prom the writer's diary.
